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NOTES
Relief for Victims of Intra-family
Assaults - The Pennsylvania
Protection from Abuse Act
Instances of one family member physically assaulting another
habitually arise from domestic disputes.' Although these disputes are
often a prelude to the more serious offenses of aggravated assault and
homicide, the frequency and extent of domestic violence is difficult to
gauge since it frequently goes unreported .2 A significant reason why this
violence is not reported is that relief has generally been ineffectual when
authorities were contacted by the injured party in the past. Unless the
police are called and arrest the offender on the scene, the victim could
find that in lieu of terminating the relationship through divorce or legal
separation, filing a criminal complaint against the offending party 3 is his
or her only recourse. In the context of most domestic cases, the consequences of resorting to the criminal justice system for relief make it an
undesirable solution. 4 In situations in which the abused party chooses not
i. There are diverse causes of domestic disputes, such as finances, alcohol, infidelity, family discipline, or more trivial matters. While most of these disputes remain verbal and
brief, it is when the response to the stresses of family living become exaggerated that the
threatening or physically assaulting of one of the family can result. Parnas, PoliceResponse
to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wisc. L. REV. 914.
2. Id. at 959. In Pennsylvania, in 1975, of 798 murders reported, 20.6% occurred
intrafamily; one-half of these were murder of spouse by spouse. "Crime in Pennsylvania,"
UNIF. CRIME REP., 41 (1975). Separate statistics for aggravated assaults between family
members are lacking; it should be noted, however, that the 16,135 aggravated assaults
reported represented 41.5% of all violent crimes for 1975. Id. at 53. Earlier statistics for the
United States showed that 40% of reported aggravated assaults occurred in the victim's
home; 45% of these were committed by someone the victim knew. The figures reported to
the police, however, represented only 65% of the aggravated assaults believed to have
occurred. Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259 (1971).
3. Various social and economic pressures exist that are unique to the family assault
situation. If the husband is charged with a felony, bail could deplete the couple's financial
resources. If bail is not possible, the incarceration may aggravate the conditions giving rise
to the original violence. Other factors such as potential for loss of employment, length of
time required to obtain final disposition, the hesitancy of the police to intervene, and
discouragement by those who would prosecute deter use of the criminal justice system for
relief in this area. Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259,
263-64 (1971).
4. Obtaining a peace bond is another alternative; its use is not extensive, however,
because of doubt as to its constitutionality. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 23 (Purdon 1964). Tate
v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), held that to imprison an indigent for his inability to pay traffic
fines was a violation of equal protection. It has been suggested that if an indigent's inability

to break up the family, the unavailability of suitable remedial aid has
resulted in the victim's having to suffer the abuse silently.
The Pennsylvania legislature, with the enactment of the Protection

from Abuse Act, 5 has created an alternative to this silence, based upon
equity principles, that provides access to a civil proceeding for immediate
protection from abuse by persons who live in the same household. 6 The
Act makes available various forms of relief, extending from a protective
order to "refrain from abuse" to the ultimate relief of ordering the
offending party to "vacate" the home for a period up to one year. 7

Temporary custody and visitation rights with regard to minor children
may also be provided under the Act.'

Prompted by legal service offices and numerous women's organizations to provide a procedure whereby a victim of domestic violence could
obtain immediate relief, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives first
introduced legislation directed toward this end in House Bill 1051. 9

House Bill 1051 proposed the eviction of a cohabitant from a dwelling
when there was an "immediate and present danger to an adult or child
cohabitant." Opposition was encountered when the bill was considered

informally by the House Judiciary Committee because it was designed to
protect the "mental" as well as the physical well-being of the cohabitant.

Except for this mental cruelty provision, the other basic substantive
provisions of this bill were similar to Senate Bill 1243.10 Senate Bill
1243, the Protection from Abuse Act, won approval in both houses. It
was signed October 7, 1976, becoming effective in sixty days.
The Act spells out remedies and procedures for adults and children

who are subject to physical "abuse" by persons who reside in the same
household. The definition of "abuse" in the Act was derived from the
current definitions of simple and aggravated assault found in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code." Engaging in the following activities will constitute
to provide a peace bond resulted in his incarceration, this would be a violation of equal
protection since no crime is involved in nonpayment. Truninger, Marital Violence: The
Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 265-67 (1971). Cf. Commonwealth v. Miller, 452 Pa.
35, 305 A.2d 346 (1973).
5.

Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -,

No. 218 (to be codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§

10181-90) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
6. Concern for the welfare of abused children is the focus of recent Pennsylvania
legislation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-24 (Purdon Supp. 1976). The basic remedy is to
remove the abused child from the harmful environment. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2208
(Purdon Supp. 1976). Note, The Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law, 81 DIcK. L.
REV. 823 (1977). While the emphasis has been upon protecting children, there is a developing public awareness that an adult member of the family may also be subject to forms of
physical abuse. See generally Gingold, One of These Days-POW!Right in the Kisser: The
Truth About Battered Wives, 5 Ms. 51, Aug. 1976; Bonner, Wife Beating on the Rise,
Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1975, at B-I, col. 5; Peterson, Battered Wife Syndrome,
Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1975, at A-6, col. 4; Cass, The Hidden Ordeal of Beaten Wives,
Philadelphia Inquirer, June 8, 1975, (Today Magazine), at 22, col. 2.
7. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 6.
8. Id. § 6(a)(4).
9. H.B. 1051, Session of 1975,
10. S.B. 1243, Session of 1975.
11.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2701, 2702 (Purdon 1973).

abuse: attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
causing bodily injury or serious bodily injury with or without a deadly
weapon; 12 placing, by physical menace, another in fear of imminent
serious bodily injury; 13 or sexually abusing minor children as defined
t4
pursuant to the Child Protective Services Law.
Any person eighteen years of age or older will be considered an
"adult" for purposes of the Act. "Family or household members"
include spouses, persons living as spouses, parents and children, or other
persons related by blood or marriage who reside in the same household. 15
Any reference to "court" in the Act means the court of common pleas,
which has jurisdiction over all proceedings under the Act. 6
Proceedings against the offending household member are commenced by filing with the prothonotary a petition setting forth the alleged
abuse 17 or by certification to the court of common pleas of an order of a
district justice entered under the Act's emergency relief provision. 8 The
initiative is upon the abused person to seek relief for himself, or upon a
parent or adult household member to seek relief on behalf of minor
children. 9 A hearing must be held within ten days of the commencement
of the proceedings, at which time the plaintiff must prove the allegations
of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 In cases in which an
immediate and present danger of abuse is shown, the court is empowered
to entertain an ex parte proceeding and to issue temporary orders to
2
protect the plaintiff or minor children. '
The court may grant relief varying from the issuance of protective
orders to the approval of consent agreements. Relief may include:
(1) Directing the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff or minor children.22
(2) Granting possession to the plaintiff of the residence or
household to the exclusion of the defendant and/or restoring
possession to the plaintiff when the residence or household is
jointly owned or leased by the parties.23
(3) When the defendant has a duty to support the plaintiff or
minor children living in the residence or household and the
defendant is the sole owner or lessee, granting possession to the
plaintiff of the residence or household to the exclusion of the
defendant by evicting the defendant and/or restoring possession
12. The definition of "attempt" found at id.,
302(b)(1); "knowingly" at id., § 302(b)(2); "recklessly"
"serious bodily injury," and "deadly weapon" at id.,
13. Id.§ 2701(a)(3).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp.
15. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 2.
16. Id.§ 3.
17. Id.§ 4; PA. R.C.P. 1901(a) (proposed).
18. Id. § 8; PA. R.C.P. 1901(b) (proposed).
19. Id. § 4.
20. Id.§ 5(a).
21. Id.§ 5(b).
22. Id.§ 6(a)(1).
23. Id.§ 6(a)(2).

§ 901(a); "intentionally" at id., §
at id., § 302(b)(3); "bodily injury,"
§ 2301.
1976).

to the plaintiff, or by consent agreement allowing the defendant
to provide suitable, alternate housing.24
tem(4) Awarding temporary custody of and/or establishing
25
porary visitation rights with regard to minor children.

Any order or agreement shall not exceed one year 26 and may be
amended at any time upon petition by either party. Experience with a
similar provision in New York and the legislature's intent indicate that a
"refrain from abuse" order is to be issued first. The severe "vacate"
order will be issued only if the abuse persists or the danger of serious
harm or death is great.27
A copy of any order under the Act will be issued to the police
department with appropriate jurisdiction. 28 This alerts the police that an
order exists and that a potential for violations of the law exists within this
particular household. The Act, however, does not empower the police to
arrest for violations of the court order; therefore, when a protection order
or an approved consent agreement is violated, the plaintiff will be required to institute contempt proceedings against the defendant to seek its
enforcement.29

The draftsmen of Pennsylvania's legislation drew upon the formulations and experiences of other states, particularly New York. In New
York incidents of marital violence are handled exclusively by the family
court.3 Although a proceeding may be commenced by a civil petition or
criminal complaint, the case will be transferred to the family court if the
requisite relationship is found. 31 By providing exclusive jurisdiction in
family court for marital violence, a civil rights question is suggested since
in incidents of assault involving two males there is recourse to either a
by
civil or criminal remedy. Pennsylvania circumvents this problem
32
spouse.
abused
the
for
remedy
criminal
alternate
the
retaining
The New York courts have strictly construed "spouses" and "members of the same family or household" to include "relationships only
where there is legal interdependence, either through a solemnized marriage or a recognized common-law union." 33 Under this interpretation,
the New York courts do not have jurisdiction over an unmarried couple
living together. 34 Recognizing that domestic violence in homes in which
24. Id. § 6(a)(3).

25.

Id. § 6(a)(4).

26. Id. § 6(b). If the parties are unable to resolve the difficulties that resulted in
violence within one year, a more permanent arrangement such as divorce or legal separation
is generally indicated.
27. Marjory Fields, Esq., Brooklyn Legal Services, testified before the Pennsylvania
Senate's Judiciary Committee in Harrisburg, Pa., May 11,1976, on the practical operation
of relevant portions of New York's Family Court Law. Interview with Ken Neeley, Staff
Assistant, Senate Judiciary Committee, in Harrisburg, Pa., February 22, 1977.
28. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 7.
29. Id. § 10.
30. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 812 (29A McKinney 1975).
31. Id. § 813.
32. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 9.
33. People v. Allen, 27 N.Y.2d 108, 261 N.E.2d 637, 313 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1970).
34. Potter v. Bennett, 40 App. Div. 2d 546, 334 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1972).

the couples are not legally married is a reality, the Pennsylvania Act
includes persons "living as spouses" in the definition of "family or
household members" 3 5 to avoid New York's dilemma.
Other differences between the New York and Pennsylvania statutes
relate to who can institute a proceeding, what forms of alternate relief
may be granted, and what sanctions may be imposed for violating court
orders. Under the New York law, the parties who may petition the family
court are not limited to the person suffering the abuse or to a parent or
household member on behalf of a minor child. Additional parties who
may institute a proceeding include "a duly authorized agency, association, society, or institution, a police officer, or a person on the court's
own motion.' 36 Pennsylvania limits those who can bring an action under
to avoid any criticism that the Act was designed to
the Act in an effort
37
break up families.
The New York statute provides for issuance of mutual protective
orders when there is some fault on both sides.3 8 While not specifically
indicated in Pennsylvania's Act, such orders could be granted pursuant to
judicial discretion because the court is "empowered to grant any protection order or approve any consent agreement to bring about a cessation of
abuse .

. .

. ,39 Legislation in both states provides for temporary protec-

tion orders on showing of good cause; 4° however, a weekend "emergency relief" provision allowing a district justice authority to grant a
temporary "vacate" order4 is unique to Pennsylvania. Regarding enforcement of court orders, New York provides for a maximum six
months' sentence for failure to obey a lawful court order;4 2 Pennsylvania,
however, requires that violations of the protection orders under the Act be
prosecuted through contempt proceedings. 4 3
Legislation similar to the Pennsylvania Act has also been adopted in
Massachusetts.' It provides for a "vacate" order not exceeding ninety
days upon the filing for divorce, for nullity of marriage, or for separate
support or maintenance. The time of the vacate order can be extended
upon further motion if, after hearing, the court finds that the health,
safety or welfare of the plaintiff or minor children would be endangered
or substantially impaired. Massachusetts' law differs from the Pennsyl35. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 2.
36. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 822 (29A McKinney 1975).
37. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 4.
38. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 842 (29A McKinney 1975). In addition to refrain from abuse
and vacate orders, New York's law provides that one spouse may be ordered "to give
proper attention to the care of the home" or "to refrain from acts of commission or
omission that tend to make the home not a proper place for the child."
39. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 6(a).
40. Id, § 5(b); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 828 (29A McKinney 1975).
41. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 8(a).
42. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 846 (29A McKinney 1975).
43. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 10.
44. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch., 208, § 34B (West Supp. 1976).

vania Act in dealing only with married persons 45 and making no distinc46
tion between physical and mental abuse.
While the Pennsylvania legislation is seemingly complete in terms of
relief, various questions are left unresolved by the Act. For example, in
situations involving spouse beating, Pennsylvania's interspousal immunity doctrine 47 suggests a possible conflict with the Act's requirement that
a plaintiff commence civil proceedings and prove abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Although a specific repealer clause abrogating
interspousal immunity is not contained in the Act,48 the legislature's
intent to repeal any acts or parts of acts that are inconsistent with the Act
49
seems clear.
Although "no order or agreement under the Act can affect title to
real property,"5° there may also be a question of whether the deprival of
property under a "vacate" order denies the evicted party due process.
The Act makes various provisions to assure the defendant his right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 51 A hearing must be held before a
common pleas judge within ten days of the filing of a petition, at which
time the plaintiff must prove the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 The defendant has a right to be represented by
counsel53 and must be issued a copy of any order. 5' A temporary order
can be issued in an ex parte proceeding only when there is an immediate
55
and present danger of abuse.
45. Id.
46. Id. Other distinctions include the time limits for hearings with Massachusetts
guaranteeing the defendant at least three day's notice of hearing for a protective order while
Pennsylvania law provides that within ten days of filing of a petition a hearing will be held.
When a temporary order is entered in Massachusetts, the defendant has five days to respond
on the question of continuing the temporary order.
47. Pennsylvania law still denies a married woman the right to sue her husband except
in a divorce proceeding or in equity to protect and recover her separate property. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 48, § Il1 (Purdon 1965).
48. The interspousal privilege of confidentiality, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 316 (Purdon
1958), has been abrogated in hearings on matters of child abuse. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
2222 (Purdon Supp. 1976). It is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended that the
same rules would prevail in a child abuse hearing under the Act.
49. The Statutory Construction Act of 1972 provides that when there is an irreconcilable conflict, the statute of the latest enactment prevails. I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1936 (1975).
50. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 6(c).
51. The necessity for notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing in order to satisfy
due process is well established. See North Ga. Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Furthermore, several states provide
similar relief either through court decisions or by statute during the pendency of divorce
proceedings and these have not been challenged. See, e.g., Hardin v. Hardin, 277 Ala. 318,
169 So. 2d 762 (1964); Smith v. Smith, 49 Cal. 2d 716, 122 P.2d 346 (1942); Collier v. Collier,
228 Ga. 38,183 S.E.2d 769 (1971); S. v. A., 118 N.J. Super. 69,285 A.2d 588 (Ch. Div. 1972);
Roberts v. Roberts, 106 N.J. Super. 108, 254 A.2d 323 (1969); Exparte Cattell, 146 Ohio St.
112, 64 N.E.2d 416 (1945); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 21.4 (Smith-Hurd 1976); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-1-11.5-7 (Burns Supp. 1976).
52. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 5(a).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 7.
55. Id. §§ 5(b), 8(a).

Any contention that proceedings under the Act are quasi-criminal
and that the defendant has therefore a right to trial by jury before being
deprived of his property without compensation appear settled by Commonwealth v. Miller,56 which indicates that when crime preventive measures are taken, there is no conflict with the right to trial by jury.
A significant problem with the Act appears with regard to the
"emergency relief" provision, 57 which empowers a district justice to
grant a "vacate" order in an ex parte proceeding when an "immediate
and present danger of abuse to plaintiff or minor children" is shown. The
order is temporary 58 and may only be issued on weekends. While the
desire to provide twenty-four hour relief to a victim has obvious merit,
there is no provision for such relief when a judge is unavailable or on
weekdays after court hours.
The effectiveness of the relief provided by the Act will depend upon
how effectively court orders will be enforced, if violated. Although
police departments should have notice of any such order, 5 9 the police are
not provided with specific authority to arrest the defendant for a violation.
Because the Act provides that any procedure will be in accordance with
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, 6° the plaintiff apparently is
required to return to court and institute a contempt proceeding before the
61
defendant will be subject to any punishment for a violation of the order.
Problems may be experienced particularly when a sole owner or
lessee is evicted from his residence or household. This is the case because
the Act does not address the practical considerations of who will make
rent or mortgage payments, who is responsible for taxes, and whether the
non-lessee possessor has any rights against the landlord to insure that
housing code standards are maintained. If the evicted party is the sole
owner, he will undoubtedly have incentive to make mortgage payments
and pay taxes because he retains title and the property will revert to him at
the expiration of the protection order. A lessor, however, would not have
the same compulsion to assume these financial obligations.
Despite the suggested problem areas under the new Act, the concept
of providing immediate relief from abuse has obvious merit. Many areas,
56. 452 Pa. 35, 305 A.2d 346 (1973).
57. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 8.
58. This is not to exceed seventy-two hours. Id. The fact that a district justice is
limited to granting "vacate" orders conflicts with the legislature's apparent intent that this
extreme remedy would be rendered by common pleas judges. Restriction of the district
justice's authority to the temporary "vacate" order could result in his issuing such an order
when it is not fully warranted but when he believes some relief is needed. Furthermore,
those persons who would misuse the procedure by filing spurious petitions would no doubt
prefer a district justice since he would be unable to provide a moderate form of relief.
Because of limitations regarding the time and extent of relief that may be granted, this
provision appears to be an unwarranted extension of the district justice's authority into
areas which should be reserved for a court of record.
59. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, § 7.
60. Id.§ 9.
61.

Id. § 10.

nevertheless, remain to be improved. Amendments are needed to restructure the "emergency relief" provision 62 to deter its misuse, either by
empowering the district justice to grant a "refrain from abuse" order and
to issue an order anytime the judge is unavailable, rather than only on
weekends, or by making some provision that the court would be available
on a twenty-four hour basis. Modification of Pennsylvania's arrest rules
to eliminate the need for the abused party to go back into court to institute
contempt proceedings when there has been a violation of the protection
order 63 and to provide adequate guidelines for the court when dealing
with the practical considerations of a "vacate" order warrants additional
legislative attention.
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62.
63.

Id. § 8.
Id.
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